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SOUTH AFRICA REVOLUTIONIZING FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION SYSTEM 
By 
Jennifer Reed* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The South African Department of Trade and Industry (“DTI”) released a draft of 
the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (“PPI Bill”) for public comment on 
November 1, 2013.
1
 DTI released the PPI Bill after conducting a review of South 
Africa’s bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”); following the review, the South African 
government began terminating many of its BITs.
2
 The PPI Bill, if passed, will regulate 
investments in place of BITs.
3
   
South Africa’s PPI Bill emerges amidst escalating tension between South Africa’s 
domestic policies and foreign investors. BITs between South Africa and foreign countries 
provide protection for foreign investors while constraining the South African 
government’s ability to pursue public policy initiatives, such as affirmative action 
initiatives. The PPI Bill provides less protection for foreign investors, especially 
concerning protections from government takings and recourse to international arbitration 
for resolution of state-investor conflicts. However, South Africa’s PPI Bill transforms the 
country’s foreign direct investment (FDI) regulation, reflecting a broader trend in the 
world of international investment for developing countries to assert their own interests in 
FDI relations and resist international arbitration.  
II.   CONTEXT FOR PPI BILL 
A. South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Approach to FDI 
The PPI Bill must be considered in the context of South Africa’s unique history 
and the larger ideological tension between its post-apartheid domestic policies and its 
obligations to foreign investors. In 1948, South Africa institutionalized apartheid, 
                                                 
* Jennifer Reed is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2015 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1
 Matthew Weiniger, Gitta Satryani, & Hannah Ambrose, Dawn of a new era of investment protection in 
South Africa – draft investment law to replace protections offered under investment treaties published for 
public comment, ARBITRATION NOTES, http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2013/11/14/dawn-of-a-new-era-for-
investment-protection-in-south-africa-draft-investment-law-to-replace-protections-offered-under-
investment-treaties-published-for-public-comment (DTI received comments on the PPI bill through January 
31, 2014). 
2
 Weiniger, supra note 1.  
3
 Id.   
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formally creating two disparate economies and societies within the state.
4
 In protest, the 
international community imposed trade sanctions and investment boycotts on South 
Africa beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing into the early 1990s.
5
 Since the end of 
apartheid in 1994, the South African government has sought to reverse the effects of the 
apartheid era on its citizens and its economy through legislative policies like Black 
Economic Empowerment (“BEE”) and expanding FDI.  
1. Post-Apartheid Expansion of FDI 
In the post-apartheid era, South Africa’s government sought to expand FDI.6 The 
era of apartheid resulted in international isolation and economic sanctions against South 
Africa, and the post-apartheid government sought to benefit from renewed FDI. FDI can 
benefit host states by creating new jobs and capital for investments, and by increasing 
access to technology, professional knowledge, and profitable export markets.
7
  
One of the government’s principal means of promoting FDI was through BITs.8 
In 1994, South Africa’s first post-apartheid government began entering into a number of 
BITs to promote FDI and mitigate domestic poverty and unemployment.
9
  Common 
features of South Africa’s BITs include an agreement to “encourage and create 
favourable conditions for investment,” fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) of 
investments, “full market value compensation for expropriated investments”, and 
“compulsory international arbitration for investor-state disputes”.10 
 
                                                 
4
 Hunter R. Clark & Amy Bogran, Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa, 27 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 337, 341 (1999).  
5
 Clark & Bogran, supra note 4, at 344.  
6
 Clark & Bogran, supra note 4, at 337.   
7
 Id. 
8
 See Matthew Coleman & Kevin Williams, South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties, Black Economic 
Empowerment and Mining: A Fragmented Meeting?, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 56, 57-59 (2008) (discussing the 
ideological conflicts between international investment law and domestic human rights policies).  
9
 Peter Samuel Guy Leon & Webber Wentzel Bowens, The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on 
Mineral Law Reform in Resource-Based Developing Economies: A South African Case Study, ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION (2005) (listing BITs entered into by South Africa from 1994-
2002). 
10
 Leon & Bowens, supra note 9.  
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2. Black Economic Empowerment and the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (“MPRDA”), represents 
an important piece of South Africa’s post-apartheid public policies and effectively turns 
over all of the country’s mineral resources to the state.11  The  MPRDA is a key 
legislative act in the BEE strategy.
12
 The MPRDA regulates South Africa’s mineral and 
oil wealth, one of the country’s most important industries and one of the most attractive 
investment opportunities for FDI. South Africa is a mineral rich nation that is a leading 
producer and exporter of gold, as well as coal, chrome, copper, diamonds, iron, 
manganese, nickel, silver, and uranium.
13
  
In May 2004, the MPRDA established a new system of mineral regulation where 
mining companies hold a “limited real right in land;” this limited right allows mining 
companies to prospect or mine minerals subject to royalties.
14
 Mining companies must 
demonstrate in their applications for prospecting or mining rights how they will “further 
the expansion of opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons and promote social 
and economic welfare.”15 The MPRDA essentially terminated private mineral rights and 
gave custodianship of all of South Africa’s mineral resources in the state.16 
B. Challenging South Africa’s Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act 
When the MPRDA went into effect in 2004, private enterprises with previous 
holdings in mineral rights were allowed to apply for licenses. However, these licenses did 
not provide the full rights to private enterprises that had been available before the 
                                                 
11
 Matthew Coleman & Kevin Williams, South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties, Black Economic 
Empowerment and Mining: A Fragmented Meeting?, 9 BUS. L. INT’L 56, 57-67 (2008): 
Broad-based black economic empowerment’ is defined in section 1 of the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act No 53 of 2003 (the ‘BEE Act’) to mean: 
‘[T]he economic empowerment of all black people [Africans, Coloureds and Indians] ... through 
diverse but integrated socio-economic strategies that include, but are not limited to-- 
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and productive 
assets; 
(b) facilitating ownership and management of the enterprises and productive assets by 
communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises; . . . 
(e) preferential procurement . . . 
 
12
 Coleman & Williams supra note 6, at 57.  
13
 Clark & Bogran, supra note 4, at 338.  
14
 Coleman & Williams, supra note 11, at 66-68. 
15
 Coleman & Williams, supra note 11, at 66.  
16
 Leon & Bowens, supra note 9.  
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MPRDA; for example, the MPRDA licenses were limited to five-year durations.
17
 In 
Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, investors from Luxembourg and Italy filed a 
suit with the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 
arguing that South Africa’s MPRDA expropriated their mineral rights.18  The investors in 
Piero argued that the MPRDA violated the FET and national treatment provisions of the 
BIT with Belgium and Luxembourg (the “Benelux BIT”) by treating foreign investors 
and investments less favorably than investments from Historically Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSA).
19
 The case settled outside of ICSID, but following the contentious 
dispute, South Africa terminated its Benelux BIT.
20
   
After the parties settled in Piero Foresti, the South African government began a 
review of its “first generation” BITs.21 The government had become concerned that BITs 
had the potential to limit its ability to carry out its “constitutional-based transformation 
agenda,” and conducted the review in conjunction with a policy favoring termination.22 
The South African government also terminated its BITs with Spain, Germany and 
                                                 
17
 Andrew Friedman, Flexible Arbitration for the Developing World: Piero Foresti and the Future of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Global South, 7 B.Y.U. INT’L. & MGMT. REV. 37, 42 (2010).  
18
 Nicholas Peacock & Hanna Ambrose, South Africa terminates its bilateral investment treaty with Spain: 
Second BIT terminated, as part of South Africa’s planned review of its investment treaties, ARBITRATION 
NOTES (Aug, 21, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2013/08/21/south-africa-terminates-its-
bilateral-investment-treaty-with-spain-second-bit-terminated-as-part-of-south-africas-planned-review-of-
its-investment-treaties; see also Marianne W. Chow, Discriminatory Equality v. Nondiscriminatory 
Inequality: The Legitimacy of South Africa’s Affirmative Action Policies Under International Law, 24 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 291, 292, 333 (2009) (South Africa never became a signatory to the ICSID Convention, 
and therefore the Piero Foresti case proceeded against South Africa under the Additional Facility Rules).  
19
 Marianne W. Chow, Discriminatory Equality v. Nondiscriminatory Inequality: The Legitimacy of South 
Africa’s Affirmative Action Policies Under International Law, 24 CONN. J. INT’L L. 291, 292, 300-301 
(2009) (discussing  historic principles of BITs; the national treatment principle requires a host country to 
treat foreign investors no less favorably than domestic investors);  See also Friedman, supra note 17, at 41 
(one of the most controversial provisions of the MPRDA mandates 26% ownership stake by HDSA in 
mineral exploitation).  
20
 Nicholas Peacock & Hanna Ambrose, South Africa terminates its bilateral investment treaty with Spain: 
Second BIT terminated, as part of South Africa’s planned review of its investment treaties, ARBITRATION 
NOTES (Aug, 21, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2013/08/21/south-africa-terminates-its-
bilateral-investment-treaty-with-spain-second-bit-terminated-as-part-of-south-africas-planned-review-of-
its-investment-treaties; see also Procedural Details: Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli and others v. Republic 
of South Africa, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=ListCases&caseId=C90
&actionVal=viewCase (for procedural history of the ICSID case filed by investors from Italy and 
Luxembourg against the government of South Africa).  
21
 Peacock & Ambrose, supra note 20 (First generation BITs refer to BITs entered into by the South 
African government shortly after apartheid ended). 
22
 Peacock & Ambrose, supra note 20.  
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Switzerland.
23
  The government has indicated that it will terminate its remaining BITs 
with European states and will discuss termination regarding other BITs.
24
  
III. THE PPI BILL 
The PPI Bill provides fewer protections for foreign investors by containing an 
ambiguous definition of “investment,” lacking an FET provision, narrowing the 
definition of expropriation, and excluding disputes from international arbitration.
 25
 
Seeking to reconcile the two interests represented in Piero Foresti, the PPI Bill’s  
establishes FDI regulations “consistent with public interest and a balance between the 
rights and obligations of investors.” 26 The dispute in Piero Foresti arose because South 
Africa’s domestic legislation promoting the public interest in empowering HDSA 
conflicted with obligations to foreign investors by way of a BIT.  
Despite the PPI Bill’s stated goal of balancing the public interest and investor 
rights, several provisions contained within the PPI Bill pose potential issues for the future 
of FDI in South Africa. First, the definition of “investment” is ambiguous.27 The 
definition is qualified by the phrases, “relates to a material economic investment,” and 
“significant or underlying physical presence in the Republic, such as operational 
facilities.”28 These phrases seem to indicate that the South African government has 
certain thresholds for the physicality or materiality of an economic investment, but 
nowhere are these thresholds further articulated.
29
 Second, the PPI Bill does not contain 
an FET provision, which are standard in BITs. FET provisions typically allow investors 
to sue the governments of host states for government actions which discriminate against 
foreign investors.
30
 Third, the PPI Bill contains a much narrower definition of 
                                                 
23
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1 (These BITs will remain in effect for sunset periods 
varying from 10 to 20 years following the South Africa’s notice of termination).  
24
 Sean Woolfrey, South Africa Overhauls its Investment Treaty Regime, MADHYAM BRIEFING PAPER, 1 
(2013).  
25
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1 (discussing four key provisions: (1) Definition of an 
“investment”; (2) Absence of a fair and equitable treatment provision; (3) Definition of “expropriation” and 
new principles of compensation for expropriation; (4) Dispute resolution mechanism).  
26
 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BILL (2013), 
available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-
Invitation-for-public-comment.pdf. 
27
 See Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1.  
28
 See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT BILL (2013), 
available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/11/Promotion-and-protection-of-investment-bill-2013-
Invitation-for-public-comment.pdf. 
29
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1. 
30
 Id. 
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expropriation than the definitions typically contained in BITs.
31
 Furthermore, in the case 
of expropriation, the PPI Bill does not guarantee an investor full market value 
compensation.
32
 
Finally, the PPI Bill does not appear to allow investors recourse to international 
arbitration to resolve investment disputes.
33
 According to the provisions of the bill, 
investors may seek resolution through Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)-
facilitated mediation, the court system, or arbitration under South Africa’s Arbitration 
Act of 1965.
34
 The bill’s language on the subject of state-investor disputes poses several 
ambiguities. It is unclear whether the bill is meant to replace only the rights guaranteed to 
investors through BITs or whether the bill also applies to rights guaranteed to investors 
through contract.
35
 The PPI Bill also does not clarify an investor’s right to commence 
arbitration against the government. In contrast, most BITs provide recourse to 
international arbitration for resolution for investor-state disputes.
36
 Furthermore, the PPI 
Bill is unclear on whether arbitration will be limited to South Africa, and whether only 
South African courts may resolve investment disputes.
37
 The South African government 
may address these ambiguities in the final draft of the bill. The government has stated, 
however, that the PPI Bill contains “more than enough clarity, transparency, and certainty 
around the domestic investment regime.”38  
                                                 
31
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1; Black’s Law Dictionary defines expropriation as “A 
governmental taking or modification of an individual's property rights, esp. by eminent domain.” 
32
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1. 
33
 See Jana Marais, Diplomats Break Silence on Investment Bill, BUSINESS DAY LIVE (March 9, 2014), 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2014/03/09/diplomats-break-silence-on-investment-bill; see also 
Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1; Relevant section provides:  
(1) A foreign investor that has a dispute in respect of action taken 
by the Government of the Republic or any organ of State, which action 
affected an investment of such foreign investor, may request the 
Department or any other competent authority to facilitate the resolution 
of such dispute by appointing a mediator or other competent body. 
(2) The Minister must make regulations on the processes and 
procedures relating to the settlement of disputes contemplated 
in subsection (1). 
 
34
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1. 
35
 Id.   
36
 See Mark Allix, Investment Bill ‘Adds to Uncertainty’ in SA, BUSINESS DAY LIVE (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2014/02/18/investment-bill-adds-to-uncertainty-in-sa.  
37
 See Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1.   
38
 See Natalie Greve, Investment Bill Imposes No New Obligations on Investors – Davies, ENGINEERING 
NEWS (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/investment-bill-imposes-no-new-
obligations-on-investors-davies-2013-11-04. 
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IV. REACTIONS & RAMIFICATIONS 
The PPI Bill has provoked strong reactions from investors and significant 
international actors. The legislation also represents current trends in FDI and international 
arbitration. Many critics are concerned that the PPI Bill does not provide levels of 
protection for foreign investors equal to the protections provided under South Africa’s 
BITs.
39
 The PPI Bill contains no FET provision, utilizes an ambiguous definition of 
“investment,” narrows the definition of expropriation, and provides no recourse to 
international arbitration.
40
  
Investors value international arbitration for resolving investment disputes because 
they do not want to be limited to a host country’s court system, which may be inefficient, 
non-transparent, and biased toward the host country.
41
 In contrast, international 
arbitration bodies are more likely to be biased toward investors’ commercial interests.42 
The PPI Bill does not address the provision in the Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) 
of the Southern African Development Community which allows foreign investors who 
have invested in that region to resolve investment-related disputes through international 
arbitration.
43
 The FIP, therefore, may allow foreign investors to take South Africa to 
international arbitration.
44
  
Critics also emphasize that termination of BITs makes South Africa a less 
attractive venue for FDI.
45
 BITs are especially significant for small and medium-sized 
companies because of the protections they offer investors.
46
 Furthermore, South Africa 
cannot afford to lose FDI, which dropped 24% in 2012 to $4.6 billion, and now 
represents less than 1% of GDP.
47
 South Africa’s FDI trails behind comparable 
“emerging-market” states like Turkey, Chile and Malaysia.48 The United Nations 
                                                 
39
 See Marais, supra note 33.  
40
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1.   
41
 Woolfrey, supra note 24, at 3. 
42
 Id.  
43
 Id.  
44
 Id.  
45
 Jana Marais, South Africa pays dearly after scrapping trade treaties, BUSINESS DAY LIVE (July 21, 2013), 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2013/07/21/south-africa-pays-dearly-after-scrapping-trade-treaties. 
46
 Nicholas Kotch and Razina Munshi, Gordhan blames lawyers for ‘unfounded’ investor uncertainty, 
BUSINESS DAY LIVE (Oct. 28, 2013),  http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2013/10/28/gordhan-blames-
lawyers-for-unfounded-investment-uncertainty (discussing how South Africa’s goal of creating a 
“transparent and predictable investment environment” contrasts with private-sector lawyers’ understanding 
of the PPI Bill).  
47
 Marais, supra note 45.  
48
 Id.   
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Conference on Trade and Development expects Nigeria’s economy to surpass South 
Africa’s as the biggest economy on the continent in the next two years.49 
The European Union has criticized South Africa’s termination of its BITs with 
EU member states.
50
 The EU is South Africa’s largest trade and investment partner, and 
South Africa has 13 additional BITs with EU member states.
51
 The U.S. and the EU have 
become increasingly concerned as South Africa pursues closer relations with other 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations.
52
 The EU has attempted to 
pacify South Africa by relaxing major trade barriers for South African sugar and wine in 
European markets.
53
  
Proponents of the PPI bill emphasize the lack of evidence that BITs increase FDI 
and the government’s legitimate concern that BITs inhibit its ability to enact positive 
public policy measures, especially measures related to public health, environmental 
protection, and social equality.
54
 The PPI Bill allows the South African government 
broader powers to pass legislation in its national interest.
55
 The BITs that will be replaced 
by the PPI bill frequently promote the interests and concerns of foreign investors over 
those of domestic investors and the South African government.
56
 Proponents also point to 
the fact that there is little reliable evidence that BITs promote FDI or that corporations’ 
decisions to invest in a state depend significantly on the availability of BIT protections.
57
 
Several countries including the US, Japan, Malaysia and  India have invested 
considerable amounts in South Africa despite not benefitting from BITs protections.
58
 
                                                 
49
 Id.   
50
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1. 
51
 Mark Allix, EU Steps Up to Have Treaties with SA Retained, BUSINESS DAY LIVE (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2013/11/12/eu-steps-up-fight-to-have-treaties-with-sa-retained. 
52
 Id; “BRICS” refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, emerging markets with 
exceptionally rapid growth. See Emerging Economies: When Giants Slow Down, THE ECONOMIST (July 27, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582257-most-dramatic-and-disruptive-period-
emerging-market-growth-world-has-ever-seen (discussing the rise of emerging markets in the twenty-first 
century).  
53
 Id.  
54
 Woolfrey, supra note 24, at 4 (discussing pending action by Phillip Morris against the Australian 
government under the Australia-Hong Kong BIT regarding Australia’s plain-packaging regulations on the 
sale of cigarettes).  
55
 Id.   
56
 Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa’s Bilateral Investment Treaties, DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION 9-10 
(2006), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf.  
57
 Woolfrey, supra note 24, at 5.  
58
 Stef Terblanche, Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, THE INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN (Nov. 8, 
2013), http://www.theintelligencebulletin.co.za/articles/Promotion-and-Protection-of-Investment-Bill-
1330.html.  
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The PPI Bill also reflects the current trend away from BITs and international 
arbitration by developing countries. International arbitration suits can be prohibitively 
expensive for developing countries and consume valuable government time and 
resources.
59
 Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have all withdrawn from ICSID citing 
clashes with domestic objectives and an alleged bias for commercial investors.
60
 In 2012, 
the Australian government stated that future trade agreements would not contain investor-
state arbitration clauses.
61
 
Proponents also point out that BITs typically include recourse to international 
arbitration for disputes with a host state even though international arbitration 
disadvantages host states in several ways. First, international arbitration is rarely a matter 
of public record.
62
 While confidentiality benefits continued business relations between 
disputing parties, a confidential process may not be the most just method for adjudicating 
matters which implicate broader public policy, including matters like human rights.
63
 
Second, where the dispute deals with conflicts between international law and domestic 
policy, the international arbitral body will likely favor the former.
64
 Third, commentators 
point out that access to international arbitration for foreign investors may detract from 
efforts to improve the domestic legal order.
65
 Foreign investors are advantaged over 
domestic investors by having recourse to international arbitral bodies which will consider 
different international approaches to investment policy rather than domestic public 
policy.  
The PPI Bill is consistent with broad changes to the face of international 
investment. South Africa has recently begun preferential business arrangements with its 
BRICS partners, replacing traditional trade and investment partners, such as Western 
European investors.
66
 The BRICS states, as well as other African and South  and Central 
American states, are redefining relationships with FDI partners and seeking to regulate 
FDI on their own terms through local venues for dispute resolution and promotion of 
domestic agendas over foreign ones.  Some of South Africa’s more recent BITs 
                                                 
59
 Calvin A. Hamilton & Paula I. Rochwerger, Trade and Investment: Foreign Direct Investment Through 
Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, 18 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2005) (discussing a U.K. supermarket 
chain’ suit against the Republic of Guyana for a debt of £12 million, despite the fact that the supermarket 
chain produces a yearly profit more than double the GDP of Guyana).  
60
 C. Ryan Reetz & Pedro J. Martinez-Fraga, Is it Still Safe to Invest in Latin America?, THE PALM BEACH 
DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 2, 2013, at A12. 
61
 Terblanche, supra note 56.  
62
 Hamilton &  Rochwerger, supra note 59, at 24. 
63
 Id.   
64
 Luke Eric Peterson, supra note 56 at 20.  
65
 Id. at 21.   
66
 Allix, supra note 51.    
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demonstrate the state’s desire to have its own interests represented in FDI relations. 
These agreements include provisions favorable to South Africa’s domestic policies and 
economic goals.
67
 
Regardless of one’s preference for protections of domestic public policy or 
foreign investment, the PPI Bill will result in a complicated situation for both domestic 
governing bodies and foreign investors. Investors will encounter two separate systems 
simultaneously regulating foreign investment. Those who invested prior to BIT 
termination will be protected by the BIT during varying sunset periods of ten to twenty 
years, while new investors will be governed according to the PPI Bill.
68
  Therefore, for 
the next ten to twenty years, foreign investors from the same industries and same native 
countries will be subject to starkly different FDI regulations. This variation in regulation 
represents a possible barrier to new or continued investment.  
V.   CONCLUSION  
South Africa’s PPI Bill demonstrates the tension between domestic policies 
addressing South Africa’s unique challenge of overcoming its apartheid legacy and 
foreign policies aimed at increasing FDI.  South Africa's decision to eradicate its BITs 
and impose a legislative framework to protect FDI may be a radical approach to these 
tensions, but it seeks to strike a compromise between domestic and foreign interests. 
Although the PPI Bill enlarges the state’s power to regulate FDI, the bill does not seek to 
eliminate FDI, but to provide protections for both foreign investors and citizens.  
The PPI Bill also represents a current trend in FDI and international arbitration. 
Developing countries are increasingly asserting their own interests in relationships with 
foreign investors and trade partners. They are also rejecting traditional trade partners and 
international arbitration as a venue for investor-state dispute resolution. The PPI Bill 
takes this trend to a whole new level by systematically eliminating BITs and their 
accompanying FDI protections.  
The full ramifications for South Africa’s PPI Bill depend on whether the bill 
undergoes substantial revisions before it goes into effect. The bill will affect foreign 
investors’ ability to seek redress for expropriation and take claims to international 
tribunals. South Africa’s decision to replace its BITs with a legislative framework may 
have been a radical policy choice, but it will provide a fascinating case study for the 
effect of BIT protections on foreign investors’ ability to resolve state-investor disputes in 
a domestic court system. 
 
 
                                                 
67
 Chow, supra note 19, at 328-329 (discussing the 2004 South Africa-Israel BIT which includes an 
exception for South Africa’s domestic affirmative action programs, like BEE, and prohibits Israeli investors 
from avoiding negative effects of treaty reforms by arguing for treatment based on older investment 
treaties).  
68
 Weiniger, Satryani, & Ambrose, supra note 1. 
